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ABSTRACT 
Lobbying, Information Transmission, and Unequal Representation* 
by Johan Lagerlöf and Lars Frisell 
We study the effects of unequal representation in the interest-group system on 
the degree of information transmission between a lobbyist and a policymaker.  
Employing a dynamic cheap-talk model in which the lobbyist cares 
instrumentally about his reputation for truthtelling, we show that the larger is the 
inequality, the less information can credibly be transmitted to the policymaker.  
We also investigate the effects of inequality on welfare and discuss the welfare 
effects of institutions that increase transparency but which as well, as an 
unintended side-effect, lower the lobbyist’s incentives for truthtelling. 
 
Keywords:  Lobbying, interest groups, reputation, information transmission, 
representation, inequality, bias 
JEL Classification:  D72, D78, D82 
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Lobbying, Informationsübertragung und ungleiche Repräsentation 
In diesem Papier wird untersucht, welche Wirkung die ungleiche Repräsentation 
in einem Interessengruppensystem auf den Grad an Informationsübertragung 
zwischen einem Lobbyisten und einem Politiker hat.  Es wird ein dynamisches 
Modell für ‚Cheap-talk’ verwendet, in dem angenommen wird, dass der Lobbyist 
Wert auf seine Reputation als aufrichtiger Informationsvermittler legt.  Dabei 
kann gezeigt werden, dass je größer die Ungleichheit im System, dem Politiker 
umso weniger Information glaubwürdig übermittelt werden kann.  Darüber 
hinaus wird die Wohlfahrtswirkung der Ungleichheit untersucht und diskutiert, 
welche Effekte solche Institutionen haben, die zwar einerseits die Transparenz 
erhöhen, mit unerwünschtem Nebeneffekt aber den Anreiz für Lobbyisten, 
Informationen wahrheitsgemäß weiterzugeben, verringern. 
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iii 1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Since the 1960s, the size of the U.S. interest-group system has grown consider-
ably, and today there are a massive number of interest groups represented in the
American capital. According to one estimate, as of the early 1990s there were
91,000 lobbyists and people associated with lobbying employed in the Washing-
ton, D.C., area.1 Also other interest-group systems, like those in Brussels and
other West European capitals, are of signiﬁcant size.2
All interests are not represented to the same extent, however. E. E. Schatt-
schneider famously argued that “the ﬂaw in the pluralist heaven is that the
heavenly chorus sings with a strong upper-class accent” (1960, pp. 34-35). Dur-
ing the years, many studies have veriﬁed the existence of such a bias.3 The bias
shows up at two levels. First, on the individual level, those of higher (social,
educational, income, and professional) status tend to participate more in groups
than those of lower status. Second, the basis of most groups is occupational,
which means that business owners and members of certain professions tend to
be overrepresented. For example, a study conducted by Scholzman and Tierney
(1986), here summarized by Baumgartner and Leech (1998, p. 96), found that
“72 percent of those organizations having Washington representation in 1980
were either corporations or trade and business associations. An additional 8
percent were professional associations, for a combined total of 80 percent of
all groups with Washington representation. This number compares with those
for citizens’ groups (5 percent); civil right s ,s o c i a lw e l f a r e ,a n dt h o s er e p r e s e n t -
ing the poor (2 percent); and those representing women, the elderly, and the
handicapped (1 percent).”
I nt h i sp a p e rw es t u d yt h ee ﬀects of such a bias on the degree of information
transmission between a lobbyist and a policymaker. We show that the larger is
the bias, the less information can credibly be transmitted to the policymaker.
We model lobbying as a dynamic cheap-talk game with incomplete information
about the lobbyist’s true objectives.4 This model feature creates an incentive
1See Phillips (1995, p. 43). For other estimates of the number of lobbyists and organizations
in Washington, see Petracca (1992) and Baumgartner and Leech (1998).
2It has been estimated that in the early 1990’s, 5,000-10,000 lobbyists were working at the
European Commission in Brussels (see Liebert, 1995, p. 433). In 2001, approximately 1,700
organizations were registered with the German Bundestag (see Bennedsen and Feldmann,
2002, p. 921, note 3).
3See, for example, the survey in Baumgartner and Leech (1998), in particular chapters ﬁve
and six.
4There are two (not mutually inconsistent) interpretations of our assumption that the pol-
1for the lobbyist to be truthful early on in the interaction with the policymaker
in order to improve his reputation for truthtelling, thereby obtaining a higher
degree of inﬂuence on a future policy decision. In order to keep the analysis
simple and tractable, we do not incorporate more than a single lobbyist into the
model. Nevertheless, thanks to the fact that the policymaker faces uncertainty
about what type of lobbyist he is dealing with, we can – in a reasonable way, we
believe – capture the notion of a bias in the interest-group system. We do this
by taking the policymaker’s prior beliefs about the lobbyist’s type as a measure
of how equal or unequal the representation is. That is, if the policymaker’s
prior beliefs suggest that, for example, it is much more likely that the lobbyist
with whom he interacts represents a right-wing interest rather than a left-wing
interest, our interpretation is then that this reﬂects a similar inequality in the
actual number of lobbyists in the interest-group system.5
Given this interpretation, we can show that more equality in the interest-
group system strengthens the lobbyist’s incentives to be truthful. This shows
up in two ways in our results. First, more equality weakens the requirement
on the parameters that is needed for an equilibrium with some information
transmission to exist. Second, within the subset of the parameter space where
such an equilibrium does exist, the degree of information transmission increases
with the degree of equality. The intuition for these results (which we will return
to in greater detail in Section 4) has to do with the fact that the mix of types in
icymaker does not know the lobbyist’s true objectives. One is that the policymaker is literally
unsure about what kind of interest the lobbyist with whom he is interacting represents. We
ﬁnd this possibility plausible, given the very large number of lobbyists that inhabit Wash-
ington, D.C., and other political centers in the world (cf. the remarks in the introductory
paragraph). The other interpretation is that the policymaker does know which group the lob-
byist represents, but that he is unsure about that group’s position on the policy in question.
This, too, seems to us as a realistic possibility. As Wright (1996, p. 154) argues: “The sheer
number of organizations located in Washington, D.C.–nearly 12,000–makes it virtually im-
possible for any public oﬃcial to be familiar with the political agendas of most groups. In the
agricultural policy domain alone, there are more than 200 active organizations and hundreds
of recurring issues. The 1985 farm bill contained more than 160 major provisions and 18 ti-
tles. With so many possible combinations of groups and issue positions, even representatives
of agricultural districts were not familiar with many of the organizations and their positions.”
See Wright (1996, pp. 154-156) for some further discussion and a defense of the assumption
that we make. See Austen-Smith (1995) for another model of lobbying in which the lobbyist’s
preferences are unknown to the policymaker.
5This means that we eﬀectively assume that the policymaker selects the lobbyist that he
interacts with through a random draw from a pool including all lobbyist in the interest-group
system. Taken literally, this is clearly unrealistic. First, the policymaker should be more able
than that in identifying the type of a lobbyist that he chooses to give access. Second, there
might be a selection bias due to diﬀerent lobbyists’ incentives to seek access (even though
it is not obvious in what direction this selection bias would go). However, we expect our
qualitative results to hold also under a less extreme assumption, as long as the policymaker’s
beliefs at least crudely reﬂect the actual distribution of lobbyists.
2the population of lobbyists aﬀects the degree to which the policymaker takes the
lobbyist’s message into account when choosing policy, which in turn determines
how attractive it is for a lobbyist to deviate from a particular equilibrium.
We also study the eﬀects of changes in the degree of equality on expected
welfare (where we assume that “welfare” is given by the policymaker’s payoﬀ).
Finally, we discuss the welfare eﬀects of two institutions that lead to greater
transparency (we call these “Mandatory Registration” and “Media Scrutiny”)
but which as well, in our environment, lower the lobbyist’s incentives for truth-
telling.
The main argument of this paper – that, in a dynamic environment, more
equal representation facilitates credible transmission of information – is com-
plementary to but diﬀerent from an old and prominent idea (sometimes referred
to as the “adversary theory of truth”6) that goes back at least to J. S. Mill’s On
Liberty: if any relevant piece of information favors at least one interest and if all
interests have an opportunity to express their views (they all “have a voice”),
then all relevant pieces information will be presented.7 T ot h ee x t e n tt h a tt h e
existence of a bias in the interest-group system makes it less likely that also the
underrepresented interests have a voice, the adversary theory of truth – just
like our reputational argument – lends support to the conclusion that more
equal representation helps elicit the truth.8
Our paper is also related to the literature on cheap talk and strategic infor-
mation transmission (see Crawford and Sobel, 1982, for a seminal contribution).
Particularly closely related is the fairly small part of that literature that assumes
that the sender and the receiver (or, in our setting, the lobbyist respectively the
policymaker) interact over more than one period and that the sender has pri-
vate information about his preferences. Sobel (1985) was the ﬁrst to model this
and to show that in such an environment the sender may care instrumentally
about his reputation for truthtelling.9 Sobel’s model has been extended and
6S e eM a n s b r i d g e( 1 9 9 2 ) .
7The idea has been studied in formal game-theoretic settings by, among others, Milgrom
and Roberts (1986), Austen-Smith and Wright (1992), Dewatripont and Tirole (1999), Krishna
and Morgan (2001), and Frisell (2002).
8One should keep in mind, however, that the adversary-theory-of-truth argument does not
concern the degree of unequal representation per se, but the question whether a particular
interest has a voice or not. If, for example, “obtaining a voice” can be achieved by any interest
that has at least some threshold degree of representation, then further equalizing the degree
of representation cannot be justiﬁed by this argument alone. This distinction could be crucial
from a policy point of view.
9Sobel’s analysis in turn draws on the work by Kreps and Wilson (1982) and Milgrom and
Roberts (1982).
3further examined by Benabou and Laroque (1992) and Morris (2001). In all
three of these papers, however, the type space is binary; that is, the sender is
assumed either to have preferences that are identical to the receiver’s or to have
preferences that diﬀer from his in one particular way. In Morris’s model, for
example, the “enemy lobbyist” always wants, say, a left-wing policy, regardless
of the true state of the world. In our model, in contrast, there are two kinds
of “enemy lobbyists”: one who always, regardless of the true state, wants a
left-wing policy and one who always wants a right-wing policy. This extension
considerably enriches the model and enables us to address questions about the
eﬀects of a bias in the interest-group system.
Finally, our paper is related to a strand of literature that models lobbying
as an exercise in strategic information transmission. See, for example, Austen-
Smith and Wright (1992), Potters and van Winden (1992), Lohmann (1995),
Lagerlöf (1997), Grossman and Helpman (2001), and Bennedsen and Feldmann
(2002).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section de-
scribes our model, which is then analyzed in Section 3. Section 4 investigates
how a change in equality aﬀects the amount of information that is credibly
transmitted in equilibrium, and it also looks at the eﬀects on expected welfare.
Section 5 discusses the welfare eﬀects of the two institutions that we mentioned
above, “Mandatory Registration” and “Media Scrutiny.” Section 6 concludes.
An appendix contains some proofs that are omitted from the main text.
2 The Lobbying Game
We model lobbying as a game between a lobbyist and a policymaker, in which
the lobbyist has private information about a policy-relevant state of the world
and about his own type. There are two possible states of the world: in a “low
state” the policymaker would – given that he knew the true state – prefer a
left-wing policy, whereas in a “high state” he would prefer a right-wing policy.
The lobbyist’s type refers to what kind of interest he represents. Here there
are three possibilities: the lobbyist may represent (i) a left-wing group that
regardless of the true state wants a policy that is as far left as possible, (ii) a
right-wing group that regardless of the true state wants a policy that is as far
right as possible, or (iii) he may be a “good” lobbyist whose interests coincide
with those of the policymaker.
4The game consists of two periods, and in each period the events are the
same: knowing the true state for that period, the lobbyist ﬁrst sends a cheap-
talk message to the policymaker, whereupon the policymaker chooses a policy.
Whereas the state of the world is drawn anew in the second period, the lob-
byist’s type is the same in the two periods. At the end of the ﬁrst period, the
policymaker’s ﬁrst-period payoﬀ is realized, which means that he can then infer
the true ﬁrst-period state. Moreover, knowing the true state, the policymaker
can at that time infer whether or not the lobbyist was truthful when sending
his ﬁrst-period message – this is the model feature that will (under some cir-
cumstances) create an incentive also for the left- and right-wing lobbyists to
be truthful in period 1, in order to enhance their reputation for being a good
lobbyist.
F o r m a l l y ,w ed e n o t et h ep e r i o dt (for t =1 ,2) policy by xt ∈ [0,1],t h ep e r i o d
t state by θt ∈ {0,1},a n dt h ep e r i o dt message by mt ∈ {0,1}.I ne a c hp e r i o d ,
the two possible states are drawn with equal probability: Pr(θt =1 )=1 /2;a n d
θ1 and θ2 are independent. The lobbyist learns θt at the beginning of period
t, whereas the policymaker knows only the distribution according to which the
state is drawn. The policymaker’s per-period payoﬀ is given by
UPM(xt,θt)=−(xt − θt)
2 .
Only the lobbyist knows his type; the policymaker’s prior beliefs about the
lobbyist’s type are as follows. With probability pG the lobbyist is of type G
(as in “good”), in which case his per-period payoﬀ function is identical to the
policymaker’s, UG (xt,θt) ≡ UPM(xt,θt). With probability pL the lobbyist is
of type L.At y p e - L lobbyist (L stands for “left”) represents an interest that
wants xt to be as small as possible, regardless of the value of θt;i np a r t i c u l a r ,
his per-period payoﬀ is given by UL (xt)=−xt. Finally, with probability pR
the lobbyist is of type R (where R is short for “right”). A type-R lobbyist
represents an interest that wants xt to be as large as possible, regardless of the
value of θt; his per-period payoﬀ is given by UR (xt)=xt. The probabilities pL,
pR,a n dpG are all strictly positive and satisfy pL + pR + pG =1 .I np e r i o d1 ,
the players discount their period 2 payoﬀs with the (common) discount factor
δ ∈ (0,2).
The sequence of events can thus be summarized as follows. (1) The lobbyist
learns θ1 a n dt h e nc h o o s e sm1. (2) The policymaker observes m1,u p d a t e sh i s
beliefs about θ1,a n dc h o o s e sx1. (3) The players’ period 1 payoﬀs are realized,
5which makes it possible for the policymaker to infer the true θ1 and thus also
whether the lobbyist’s report was truthful or not. Using this information, the
policymaker updates his beliefs about the lobbyist’s type. (4) The lobbyist
learns θ2 a n dt h e nc h o o s e sm2. (5) The policymaker observes m2,u p d a t e sh i s
beliefs about θ2,a n dc h o o s e sx2. (6) The players’ period 2 payoﬀs are realized.
In the following section we will solve for the perfect Bayesian equilibria of the
game described above, where this equilibrium concept is deﬁned in the usual
way: both players must make optimal decisions at all information sets given
their beliefs, and these beliefs are formed using Bayes’ rule whenever that is
deﬁned.
3 Analysis of the Lobbying Game
3.1 The Second Period
Let us begin the analysis by considering the players’ behavior in period 2. As in
any cheap-talk game, there exists an equilibrium of the period 2 game in which
there is no information transmission at all, a so-called babbling equilibrium.10 In
the following, however, we will disregard all such equilibria and instead restrict
our attention to equilibria in which the type-G lobbyist in both periods tells
the truth with probability one, that is, equilibria in which G chooses mt =0
if θt =0 ,a n dmt =1if θt =1 .11 Given that G reports truthfully and that
the policymaker assigns a positive probability to the event that he is indeed
dealing with a type-G lobbyist (i.e., that pG > 0), the policymaker’s decision
will (at least to some extent) be made contingent on the lobbyist’s message; in
particular, a second-period message m2 =0will induce a lower x2 than will a
message m2 =1 . As a consequence, since reputational concerns do not matter
in period 2, the type-L lobbyist always chooses m2 =0and the type-R lobbyist
always chooses m2 =1 , regardless of whether the true state is low or high.
10To see this, suppose all three types of lobbyists, regardless of which state they have ob-
served, “babble” by playing m2 =0and m2 =1with equal probability. If the policymaker
(correctly) believes that this is the way L, R,a n dG behave, then he cannot infer any infor-
mation from their messages and thus always chooses x2 =1 /2, his optimal policy given the
ﬁfty-ﬁfty prior. This in turn means that no type of lobbyist has a (strict) incentive to deviate
from the babbling strategy, which conﬁrms the policymaker’s beliefs about their behavior.
Accordingly, all types’ sending messages that are uncorrelated with the true state and the
policymaker’s choosing the policy 1/2 constitute an equilibrium.
11We will also disregard any “mirror” equilibrium (of the period 2 game as well as of the
full game) where the labels have the opposite meaning, so that, for example, m2 =0means
θ2 =1and m2 =1means θ2 =0 . Clearly, since labels do not have any inherent meaning in
our model, such an equilibrium will exist whenever the corresponding “normal” one does.
6The policymaker realizes that the diﬀerent types behave in this fashion and
updates his beliefs about θ2 accordingly, using Bayes’ rule. In particular, let e pj
(for j = L,G,R) denote the policymaker’s updated beliefs about the lobbyist’s
type at the stage where he has inferred θ1 b u tn o ty e to b s e r v e dm2.12 Then the




e pG+2e pR if m2 =1
e pL
e pG+2e pL if m2 =0 .
(1)
Given these beliefs, the policymaker chooses his optimal period 2 policy. Because
the policymaker’s payoﬀ function is quadratic and the state equals either zero or
unity, this optimal policy is identical to the probability he assigns to the event
that θ2 =1 , as given by (1).
3.2 The First Period
A Partially Informative Equilibrium Let us now turn to period 1. We
will, to start with, look for an equilibrium in which both L and R,a l s ow h e n
the state is not in their favor, tell the truth with positive probability. More
speciﬁcally, we want to ﬁnd an equilibrium in which the lobbyist’s period 1
behavior is such that G always tells the truth, and L and R tell the truth for
sure when the state is in their favor and with probability λL, respectively λR,
otherwise (with λL,λR ∈ (0,1)).15
We will call the kind of equilibrium described above a “partially informative
equilibrium.” Given the lobbyist’s behavior in such an equilibrium, the poli-
cymaker’s updated beliefs about θ1, after having observed a message m1,c a n




1+pR(1−λR)−pL(1−λL) if m1 =1
pL(1−λL)
1+pL(1−λL)−pR(1−λR) if m1 =0 .
(2)
Let us investigate the incentives to lie, respectively to tell the truth, for a
type-R lobbyist who knows that θ1 =0 . If this lobbyist is untruthful and plays
12The probabilities e pj are of course endogenous to the model and will be solved for later.
13Here we implictly assume that e pL < 1 (in the expression for m2 =1 ) respectively e pR < 1
(in the expression for m2 =0 ). But these inequalities must hold given that G reports truthfully
in both periods.
14The easiest way to verify these and the other expressions for the policymaker’s updated
beliefs that we use in the paper is to draw a tree diagram that graphically shows the possible
outcomes and the associated probabilities. Having done this, one can readily calculate, for
example, the likelihood that θ2 =1given that m2 =1 .
15Formally: G chooses m1 =0if θ1 =0 ,a n dm1 =1if θ1 =1 ; L chooses m1 =0if θ1 =0 ,
and m1 =1with probability λL ∈ (0,1) if θ1 =1 ;a n dR chooses m1 =1if θ1 =1 ,a n d
m1 =0with probability λR ∈ (0,1) if θ1 =0 .
7m1 =1 , he will in period 2 be recognized as a type-R lobbyist. If so, no in-
f o r m a t i o nt r a n s m i s s i o ni sp o s s i b l ei nt h a tp e r i o d 16 and, since the policymaker’s
prior assigns equal probability to the two states, the second-period policy equals
1/2. This is the disadvantage for R of lying: it deprives him of the opportunity
to have an inﬂuence on the second-period policy. The advantage of lying is
that this induces the policymaker to pick a ﬁrst-period policy that is relatively
favorable to R. In particular, that policy will equal Pr(θ1 =1| 1),a sg i v e nb y
(2). Hence, the overall payoﬀ for a type-R lobbyist who knows that θ1 =0and
who plays m1 =1equals
1 − pL (1 − λL)





At y p e - R lobbyist who knows that θ1 =0a n dw h o ,t r u t h f u l l y ,p l a y sm1 =0
will (at the stage when the policymaker has inferred θ1 b u tn o ty e to b s e r v e d
m2) give rise to the following posterior beliefs about his type:
e pR =
pRλR
pL + pG + pRλR
, e pG =
pG
pL + pG + pRλR
, (4)
and e pL =1− e pR − e pG;t h i sc a nb ev e r i ﬁed by using Bayes’ rule. This means
that the second-period policy (recall that in the second period R always chooses
m2 =1 ) will equal
Pr(θ2 =1| 1) =
e pG + e pR





where the ﬁrst equality follows from (1) and the second from (4). The ﬁrst-
period policy equals Pr(θ1 =1| 0), as given by (2). Hence, the overall payoﬀ
for a type-R lobbyist who knows that θ1 =0and who plays m1 =0equals
pL (1 − λL)





For λR ∈ (0,1) indeed to be part of an equilibrium, R must be indiﬀerent
between being truthful and not when knowing that θ1 =0 . Setting (3) and (6)
e q u a lt oe a c ho t h e ra n dt h e nr e w r i t i n g ,o n eh a s
1 − pR (1 − λR) − pL (1 − λL)





The left-hand side of this equation is symmetric with respect to L and R. Hence,
the corresponding incentive constraint for the type-L lobbyist (i.e., that λL ∈
16It is straightforward to verify that if it is common knowledge that the lobbyist is of type
R (or if it is common knowledge that he is of type L), then any equilibrium must be babbling.
8(0,1))m u s tl e a dt oa ne q u a t i o nw i t ht h es a m el e f t - h a n ds i d ea si n( 7 ) ;i n
particular, (7) and the requirement that λL ∈ (0,1) imply that pRλR = pLλL
(see the denominator of the right-hand side of (7)). By using this equality to






























R are always below unity. In order to
have λ
∗
L > 0 (or, equivalently, λ
∗
R > 0),17 we need the following condition:18











S of a rw eh a v ec h e c k e do n l yo n eo ft h et y p e - R lobbyist’s two incentive con-
straints. The other incentive constraint requires that R must want to play
m1 = mH with probability one if knowing that θ1 =1 . One can easily verify,
however, that this is always satisﬁed. Moreover, the two incentive constraints
for L are satisﬁed exactly when the ones for R are.
The following proposition sums up the results.
Proposition 1. A partially informative equilibrium exists if and only if pL >











L is given by (8).
We will shortly return to a further discussion of this kind of equilibrium.
A Non-Informative Equilibrium Next we will look for an equilibrium in
which neither L nor R reports truthfully in period 1, but G does. Formally,
we want to ﬁnd an equilibrium in which G reports m1 =0if θ1 =0 ,a n d
m1 =1if θ1 =1 ;a n dL (respectively, R)r e p o r t sm1 =0(respectively, m1 =1 )
regardless of the state. Although the name is a bit of a misnomer, we will call
this kind of equilibrium a “non-informative equilibrium,” since here only the
type-G lobbyist transmits any information.
17T h ef a c tt h a tt h er e q u i r e m e n t sλL > 0 and λR > 0 are satisﬁed for exactly the same
parameter values is due to the assumption that the type-L and type-R lobbyists have linear
payoﬀ functions: both of them care only about the distance between the policy induced by a
report mt =0and the policy induced by a report mt =1 .
18This condition was obtained by substituting pG =1− pL − pR into (8) and then solving
the inequality λ∗
L > 0 for pL.
9In order to see under what circumstances a non-informative equilibrium
exists, consider the incentives for a type-R lobbyist who knows that θ1 =0
to follow the equilibrium and lie (by playing m1 =1 ), respectively to deviate
a n dt e l lt h et r u t h( b yp l a y i n gm1 =0 ). If this lobbyist lies, he will in period 2 be
recognized as a type-R lobbyist. As a consequence, any information transmission
in period 2 is impossible19 and the second-period policy, which also is R’s payoﬀ,







where these expressions simply are the policymaker’s updated belief that the
state is high upon observing a message m1 =1 , given the equilibrium behavior
of L, R,a n dG (the ﬁrst expression was obtained by applying Bayes’ rule and
the second by using the identity pG =1− pL − pR).
Suppose now instead that R deviates and tells the truth in the ﬁrst period.
Then the policymaker will, at the time when his ﬁrst-period payoﬀ has been
realized, think he is dealing with a type-R lobbyist with probability zero. Hence,
when R in the second period sends the message m2 =1 , the policymaker will
infer that this must come from a type-G lobbyist (since a type-L lobbyist always
plays m2 =0 ) and accordingly set the second-period policy, which also is R’s
second-period payoﬀ,e q u a lt o1. R’s ﬁrst-period payoﬀ if he deviates equals the
policymaker’s updated belief that the state is high upon observing a message





1 − (pR − pL)
(where again the ﬁrst expression was obtained by applying Bayes’ rule and the
second by using pG =1− pL − pR).









1 − (pR − pL)
+ δ ⇔
1 − pL − pR





The latter inequality, which is symmetric with respect to pL and pR,c a nb e
rewritten as pL ≤ ϕ(pR,δ),w h e r eϕ(pR,δ) is as deﬁned in (9). Because of the
symmetry that we just noted, also the corresponding incentive constraint for L
is satisﬁed exactly when pL ≤ ϕ(pR,δ). Moreover, it is quite clear that neither
19See footnote 16.
10L nor R wants to deviate from a non-informative equilibrium when knowing
that the state is in their favor.
We thus have the following result.
Proposition 2. A non-informative equilibrium exists if and only if pL ≤
ϕ(pR,δ),w h e r eϕ(pR,δ) is given by (9).
Other Equilibria Can there exist other (non-babbling) equilibria than the
non-informative and partially informative ones? One possibility would be that,
in period 1, only one of L and R is truthful with positive probability when the
state is against him, and the other always reports that the state is in his favor
(that is, in terms of the notation used earlier, either λL > 0 and λR =0 ,o r
λL =0and λR > 0). In the appendix (Lemma A1), however, we prove that
this behavior cannot be part of an equilibrium. The only remaining possibility
is that both L and R are truthful with probability one in the ﬁrst period (i.e.,
λL = λR =1 ). But this cannot be part of an equilibrium either (see Lemma
A2 in the appendix).20 Hence, in the rest of the paper we will discuss the
players’ (and, in particular, the lobbyist’s) behavior in a non-informative and
in a partially informative equilibrium.
4E ﬀects of a Change in Equality
The analysis of the previous section tells us that whether we can sustain an
equilibrium in which L and R transmit some information in period 1 depends
on how pL relates to the function ϕ(pR,δ),w h i c hw a sd e ﬁn e di n( 9 ) .F i g u r e1
plots the graph of ϕ in the (pL,p R)-space for a given pG and δ.21 In the region
southwest of the graph of ϕ a non-informative equilibrium exists (see Proposition
2), and in the shadowed region northeast of this graph a partially informative
equilibrium exists (see Proposition 1). In the following we will discuss how
changes in the relative magnitude of pL and pR,f o raﬁxed pG,a ﬀect the degree
of information transmission and social welfare.
20The cases we have mentioned cover all possible equilibria in which G tells the truth with
probability one in both periods. There are additional equilibria in which G does not do this (for
example, the babbling equilibria discussed in footnote 10). From our perspective, however,
these other equilibria are less interesting as they involve a smaller amount of information
transmission.
21A change in pG c a ni nt e r m so ft h i sﬁgure be thought of as a shift of a straight line with
slope −1 (as the one drawn in the ﬁgure). It can readily be veriﬁed that, consistent with the
way the ﬁgure is drawn, ϕ(pR,δ) is decreasing in both its arguments, and it is convex in pR.
Moreover, ϕ(0,δ)=1and ϕ(1,δ)=0for all δ, and the function has the following symmetry
property: ϕ((2 − δ)/4,δ)=( 2− δ)/4.
11Information Transmission Let us ﬁrst consider the eﬀects on the degree of
information transmission. From Figure 1 we see that, due to the fact that ϕ
is convex in pR, the requirement on the parameters for a partially informative
equilibrium to exist is weaker the more equal pL and pR are. In particular, if
pL = pR, a partially informative equilibrium exists for all pG < δ/2;b u ti fpL is
suﬃciently close to (1 − pG) and pH is suﬃciently close to zero (or vice versa),
a partially informative equilibrium exists only for pG’s very close to zero. As
we mentioned in the introduction, we will interpret the closeness of pL and pR
as a measure of the degree of equal representation in the interest-group system
or, put more brieﬂy, as a measure of equality.T ob em o r ee x a c t ,l e tu sd e ﬁne
∆ ≡ (pR − pL)
2. In terms of this notation, more equality in the sense of a lower
∆ is conducive to the existence of a partially informative equilibrium.
Not only is more equality conducive to information transmission in that it
weakens the requirement on the parameters for a partially informative equilib-
rium to exist, equality is good for information transmission also within the region
in which such an equilibrium exists. To see this, let us calculate the ex ante





























This expression is decreasing in ∆: more equality gives rise to more truthtelling.22
We sum up the above results in the following proposition.
Proposition 3. Equality is conducive to information transmission in the sense
that: (i) more equality weakens the requirement on the parameters needed
for a partially informative equilibrium to exist; and (ii), given that such
an equilibrium exists, the degree of information transmission in period 1
increases with the degree of equality.
The intuition behind these results is a little bit involved, and in order to
understand it better we will initially explain it in somewhat simpliﬁed terms.
Consider the incentives for, say, R to “invest” in truthtelling in the ﬁrst period
by reporting m1 =0when the state is against him (i.e., when θ1 =0 ). The





2 =( 1+pG)/2, which is independent of ∆ (or, more accurately, a function only of the
sum of pL and pR).
12“cost” of this investment is determined by the extent to which the policymaker
takes the message m1 =0into account when choosing the ﬁrst period policy.
This, in turn, depends on the number of type-L lobbyists in the population:
the investment cost is lower if there are many type-L lobbyists, since then the
policymaker discounts the message more heavily. Symmetrically, the cost of
investing in truthtelling for a type-L lobbyist who knows that θ1 =1is lower
the more type-R lobbyists there are. Thus, in order to get as much truthtelling
as possible from both the type-L’s and the type-R’s, we need “many of both
types” or, in other words, an equal number of the two types.
The above explanation hopefully provides some insight into why equality is
conducive to information transmission. Still, it focuses on only one particular
eﬀect while abstracting from others; in particular, it does not say anything
about how the payoﬀ from not being truthful is aﬀected by a change in the
number of the opposite type, and it also ignores the eﬀect on the second-period
payoﬀ. In order to get a deeper understanding of the logic, let us therefore
study in greater detail the condition needed for a non-informative equilibrium
to exist. The logic for this equilibrium is the most transparent one, since the
algebra needed to derive it is less complex than that for a partially informative
equilibrium; in particular, in a non-informative equilibrium (or if deviating from
such an equilibrium), only the ﬁrst-period payoﬀ of L and R depends on pL or
pR.23
Thus, consider again the situation where R, in a non-informative equilibrium,
knows that θ1 =0and is about to choose whether to lie or to tell the truth. By
using the identity pL =1−pR −pG,w ec a nr e w r i t eR’s equilibrium payoﬀ and
his payoﬀ if deviating so that these expressions are functions of pR and pG but








1 − pR − pG
2 − 2pR − pG
+ δ.
The ﬁrst term of Ueq is the policymaker’s chosen policy after having observed
a message from the lobbyist claiming that the state is high. For a ﬁxed pG,t h i s
policy takes values between 1/(2 − pG) and 1, and its exact magnitude depends
on the number of type-R’s in the population of lobbyists: as the number of
type-R’s becomes larger, the policymaker discounts the informational value of
23Therefore, studying the non-informative equilibrium is a good way of understanding also
the questions why more equality is conducive to the existence of a partially informative equi-
librium and why, given that such an equilibrium exists, more equality increases the degree of
ﬁrst-period truthtelling.
13the message more and thus chooses a lower policy. Hence, Ueq is decreasing in
pR.T h eﬁrst term of Udev, which takes values between 0 and (1 − pG)/(2 − pG),
is the policymaker’s chosen policy after having observed a message from the lob-
byist claiming that the state is low. In equilibrium, such a message is sent only
by type-L and type-G lobbyists, and the less common the type-L’s (and thus the
more common the type-R’s) are in the population, the more the policymaker
will rely on the message and the lower policy he will choose. Hence, also Udev
is decreasing in pR.
The graphs of Ueq and Udev are depicted in Figure 2. Note that the graphs
relate to each other in a symmetric fashion.24 The key observation to make
– and the fundamental reason why inequality is conducive to the existence of
a non-informative equilibrium – is that Ueq is convex in pR: for a marginal
increase in the number of type-R lobbyists in the population, the downward
adjustment of the policy is larger for smaller than for higher values of pR;t h i si s
simply a property of Bayes’ rule. Because of the symmetric relationship between
Ueq and Udev, the graph of Udev must be concave in pR. I ti st h i sd i ﬀerence
in curvature that explains why the equilibrium requirement Ueq ≥ Udev is less
likely to hold for values of pR close to (1 − pG)/2 than it is for pR’s close to zero
or (1 − pG). For a high degree of equality, the mix of types in the population of
lobbyists induces policy decisions that make it relatively attractive to deviate
from the non-informative equilibrium.
Welfare Let us now consider the eﬀects of a change in equality on welfare.
We deﬁne “welfare” as being identical to the policymaker’s payoﬀ,s ot h a tp e r -
period welfare is given by W (xt,θt)=−(xt − θt)
2.E v e nt h o u g he q u a l i t y ,a sw e
saw above, is conducive to information transmission, this does not necessarily
mean that it is welfare-enhancing. In fact, assuming that we are in the subset
of the parameter space where a partially informative equilibrium exists (and
that it also is played), there are two forces that work in opposite directions.
First, as we just mentioned, more equality makes the ﬁrst-period messages of
the type-L and type-R lobbyists more informative, which is good for welfare.
Second, more equality (as we have deﬁn e di ti nt h i sp a p e r )m e a n st h a tt h e r ei s
greater uncertainty about which type of lobbyist the policymaker is facing, and
this has a negative impact on (expected) welfare.
24This is because of the symmetry of the model: a parameter conﬁguration (pL,p H,p G)=
(p0,p 00,p G) i sj u s tt h em i r r o ri m a g eo ft h ec o n ﬁguration (pL,p H,p G)=( p00,p 0,p G).
14In order to see which one of these eﬀects is the strongest, let us calculate the
expected welfare for each of the two periods in a partially informative equilib-









That is, in the ﬁrst period, the two eﬀects discussed above cancel each other
out: the expected ﬁrst-period welfare is independent of pR and pL (or, more
accurately, it depends only on their sum, pR + pL). As one would expect,
however, EWPI
1 is increasing in pG (since G is always truthful) and in δ (since
a larger δ induces L and R to be more truthful).


















Hence, the expected second-period welfare is decreasing in the degree of equality.
Given the discussion above, this should hardly come as a surprise: since in
period 2 there is no reputation eﬀect that can be strengthened by an increase
in equality, only the second, negative eﬀect (i.e., more equality yields more
uncertainty) matters.
Thus, the overall eﬀect on expected welfare of an increase in equality is
negative. The following proposition states this result.25
Proposition 4. Suppose that a partially informative equilibrium is played.
Then overall expected welfare is decreasing in the degree of equality.
5 Mandatory Registration and Media Scrutiny
A key assumption of our analysis is that the policymaker faces uncertainty
about the true interests of the lobbyist. In reality, the degree to which pol-
icymakers know the identity of the employers of any lobbyists that they are
confronted with should depend on, among other things, regulatory and other
kinds of institutions. For example, in the United States, Title III of the Leg-
islative Reorganization Act (known as the Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act)
of 1946 requires that individuals and groups that are accepting payment for the
25One can show that the same qualitative result holds with the following linear welfare
function: W (xt,θt)=−|xt − θt|. See Lagerlöf and Frisell (2004).
15purpose of inﬂuencing Congress must register with the clerk of the House or
the secretary of the Senate.26 This regulation has sometimes been criticized for
being ambiguous on the question who exactly is required to register and who is
not; as a consequence, it is not clear that all those who we would think of as
being “lobbyists” actually register. Nevertheless, the presence of such a require-
ment should at least work in the direction of greater transparency. The media
is another institution that plausibly could aﬀect the degree of public knowledge
about which interests lobbyists represent.
To the extent that institutions like these reduce the amount of uncertainty
about the lobbyists’ true interests, are they also welfare-enhancing? The anal-
ysis of Section 3 suggests one reason why they may in fact be detrimental to
welfare. Namely, it is this uncertainty that disciplines the type-L and type-R
lobbyists’ ﬁrst-period behavior and induces them to be truthful with positive
probability. There is, on the other hand, also a positive eﬀect associated with
making the lobbyist’s interests known: on those occasions when the lobbyist in
fact is “good,” knowing this will be valuable because then the policymaker can
take the lobbyist’s message fully into account when choosing policy.
In the following we will investigate which of these eﬀects is the strongest. We
do this by comparing the expected welfare in the partially informative equilib-
rium of our lobbying game with the expected welfare levels in two benchmarks,
both of which are meant to, at least crudely, capture institutions such as the
ones discussed above. Our ﬁrst benchmark, or institution, we call “Mandatory
Registration.” Under this institution, the identity of the lobbyist becomes com-
monly known at the outset of the game. The expected single-period welfare in
such a situation is −1
4 (pL + pR)=−1






One can show that this level of expected welfare is always higher than the
expected welfare in a partially informative equilibrium.27 This result is perhaps
not very surprising. After all, knowing the identity of the lobbyist from the very
beginning of the game should be quite useful.
Our second institution we call “Media Scrutiny.” Relative to the ﬁrst bench-
26See, for example, Wright (1996, pp. 32-36).
27The proof of this as well as the other claims to be made in this section can be found in
Lagerlöf and Frisell (2004).
16mark, here the information is revealed at a later stage. In particular, under
Media Scrutiny the identity of the lobbyist is made known to the policymaker
(say, by an investigative journalist) at the end of period 1, and it is common
knowledge that this will happen. The expected ﬁrst-period welfare in such a
situation is the same as in the non-informative equilibrium, which one can show
is equal to −1/4+p2
G/[4(1 − ∆)]. The expected second-period welfare is given









δ (1 − pG)
4
(which, unsurprisingly, is lower than expected overall welfare under Mandatory
Registration). Although one may think that the institution Media Scrutiny
should be easier to beat than that of Mandatory Registration, one can show
that also this institution dominates the partially informative equilibrium. Ap-
parently, at least in our simple model, the negative eﬀect (i.e., less information
transmission in the ﬁrst period) is dominated by the positive one (i.e., when the
lobbyist is of type G, knowing this is valuable).
We summarize the above results in the following observation.
Observation 1. Mandatory Registration yields higher overall expected wel-
fare than Media Scrutiny. Moreover, Mandatory Registration and Media
Scrutiny both yield higher overall expected welfare than the partially in-
formative equilibrium.
6C o n c l u s i o n s
In this paper we have developed a model of informational lobbying and repu-
tation building that builds on previous work by Sobel (1985). In contrast to
Sobel (1985) and other previous papers, we assumed that in the population of
lobbyists there are those who represent left-wing interests as well as those who
represent right-wing interests, and the number of each type is arbitrary. The
policymaker does not know the type of the lobbyist with whom he interacts,
but his beliefs about this reﬂect the relative numbers of types in the popula-
tion. This modeling framework enabled us to ask how a change in the relative
number of left- and right-wing lobbyists aﬀects the lobbying behavior and the
policy outcome.
The main insight from the analysis (succinctly summarized by Figure 1) is
17that a more equal representation of the left- and the right-wing interests facil-
itates credible transmission of information. The prediction that a more equal
mix of left- and right-wing lobbyists gives rise to more information transmission
is in principle testable, either by using ﬁeld data or by designing and running
an experiment. The prediction also lends some support for the normative con-
cern expressed by many commentators about the fact that certain groups are
much better represented than others: a larger bias in our model means that
the policymaker’s (ﬁrst-period) decision will be less informed by the lobbyist’s
private information. We also, however, pointed to a limitation to this argument:
a larger bias (as this is interpreted in our model) means that the policymaker
faces less uncertainty about which type of lobbyist he is interacting with; as a
consequence, expected welfare actually increases as the bias becomes larger.
A common concern about lobbying in legislatures and other decision making
bodies is the lack of transparency. This has lead the U.S. to introduce regulation
that requires active lobbyists to register, and other countries (for example the
U.K.; see Liebert, 1995, p. 432) have considered doing this. To the extent
that such regulation does increase transparency in that it reduces the amount
of uncertainty on the part of the legislators about the lobbyists’ true interests,
the analysis of this paper suggests that the transparency comes at a cost: it
is the uncertainty that gives rise to the reputation eﬀect and which disciplines
the lobbyists’ behavior and induces them to be relatively truthful. We showed,
however, that – at least in our relatively simple model – the beneﬁts with
transparency always exceed this cost. It may be an interesting topic for future
work to investigate how general this conclusion is.
Appendix
Lemma A1. An equilibrium in which the types behave as follows does not
exist: G chooses m1 =0if θ1 =0 ,a n dm1 =1if θ1 =1 ;Lc h o o s e s
m1 =0regardless of whether θ1 =0or θ1 =1 ; and R chooses m1 =1
with probability one if θ1 =1 ,a n dm1 =0with probability ξ ∈ (0,1) if
θ1 =0 .
Proof. First note that, given the stated behavior, the ﬁrst-period policy after
18a message m1 =0 , respectively m1 =1 ,i sg i v e nb y
pL
2pL + pG + ξpR
and
pG + pR
pG +( 2− ξ)pR
.
Now consider the period 1 incentives for R when knowing that θ1 =0 .I fR tells
the truth in the ﬁrst period (m1 =0 ) and then optimally reports m2 =1in the
second, his overall payoﬀ equals
pL
2pL + pG + ξpR
+ δ
e pG + e pR
e pG +2e pR
=
pL





Here, the second term before the equality sign uses (1), and the second term
after the equality sign uses the fact that e pG = pG/(pL + pG + ξpR) and e pR =
ξpR/(pL + pG + ξpR).I f i n s t e a d R lies in the ﬁrst period (m1 =1 ), he will
in the second period be recognized as the R-type (e pR =1 ). Thus, his overall
payoﬀ then equals
pG + pR





Setting (11) equal to (12), as ξ ∈ (0,1) requires, we have
pL
2pL + pG + ξpR
−
pG + pR








Next consider the period 1 incentives for L when knowing that θ1 =1 .I f
L follows the prescribed behavior and chooses m1 =0 , he will in period 2 be
recognized as the L-type. Thus, his overall payoﬀ equals
−
pL





If L deviates and plays m1 =1 , he will in period 2 be thought of as being the
L-type with zero probability; hence, by then sending the message m2 =0 ,h e
can induce the policymaker to set the second-period policy equal to zero. His
overall payoﬀ is therefore given by −(pG + pR)/[pG +( 2− ξ)pR].I no r d e rf o r










pG +( 2− ξ)pR
⇔
pL
2pL + pG + ξpR
−
pG + pR





Using (13) to eliminate the left-hand side of this inequality and then rewriting,
we have 1 ≤ (pG + ξpR)/(pG +2 ξpR), which is impossible. ¤
19Lemma A2. An equilibrium in which all three types choose m1 =0if θ1 =0 ,
and m1 =1if θ1 =1 ,d o e sn o te x i s t .
Proof. It suﬃces to show that R has an incentive to deviate from his pre-
scribed behavior m1 =0if θ1 =0 .I f R knows that θ1 =0and follows the
prescribed behavior, then x1 =0(since all types of lobbyists are truthful, the
policymaker follows their advice). In period 2, R will report m2 =1regard-
less of which state he has observed. Observing this message, the policymaker
chooses x2 a c c o r d i n gt o( 1 ) ,b u tw i t he pG = pG and e pR = pR (since all types are
truthful in period 1, the policymaker does not update his prior beliefs about
the lobbyist’s type). Thus, if knowing that θ1 =0and following his prescribed
strategy, R gets the overall payoﬀ δ (pG + pR)/(pG +2 pR).I fi n s t e a dR devi-
ates and chooses m1 =1 ,t h e nx1 =1 . Since this leads to an out-of-equilibrium
event, the policymaker’s beliefs will not be determined by Bayes’ rule. Let us
suppose that his beliefs are the worst ones possible from R’s point of view,
namely e pR =1(if this nevertheless gives R an incentive to deviate, then clearly
we have proven the claim in the lemma). This means that there cannot be any
information transmission in period 2, so x2 =1 /2. Summing up, R has an








One can easily verify that this holds for all δ ∈ [0,2]. ¤
Lemma A3. Expected ﬁrst-period welfare in a partially informative equilib-
rium is given by EWPI
1 = −1/4+δpG/8.
Proof. There are four possible realizations of (θ1,m 1):
(θ1,m 1) ∈ {(0,0),(1,0),(0,1),(1,1)}.
The event (1,1) happens with probability 1
2 [pR + pG + pLλ
∗
L],i nw h i c hc a s e




1 − pL (1 − λ
∗
L)
1+pR (1 − λ
∗






pR (1 − λ
∗
R)
1+pR (1 − λ
∗





The event (0,1) happens with probability 1
2pR (1 − λ
∗




1 − pL (1 − λ
∗
L)
1+pR (1 − λ
∗





20By symmetry, the event (0,0) happens with probability 1
2 [pRλ
∗
R + pG + pL],i n
which case welfare is
−
µ
pL (1 − λ
∗
L)
1+pL (1 − λ
∗





Finally, again by symmetry, the event (1,0) happens with probability 1
2pL (1 − λ
∗
L),
in which case welfare is
−
µ
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∗
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1+pL (1 − λ
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Multiplying the ﬁrst ratio by (1 + pL − pR), the second by (1 + pR − pL),a n d
then simplifying, one has
EWPI
1 = −









1 − (pR − pL)
2
i .
By using the deﬁnition of λ
∗
L (see (8)) and by performing some straightforward
calculations, one can show that
2pLλ
∗















21Plugging this into the above expression for EWPI








































1 − (pR − pL)
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1 − (pR − pL)
2
i ,
w h i c hi nt u r ns i m p l i ﬁes to the expression in the lemma. ¤
Lemma A4. Expected second-period welfare in a partially informative equi-




















1 − (pR − pL)
2
i.
Proof. If either the L-type or R- t y p ew a sd r a w ni nt h eﬁrst period and the
state was against this lobbyist and he chose to lie, then the lobbyist’s type will be
known in period 2; hence, there can be no information transmission in period 2,
so welfare is −1/4. This happens with probability 1
2pL (1 − λ
∗
L)+1
2pR (1 − λ
∗
R).
If the above event does not happen, then there will be some information
transmission in period 2. There are eight possible events. Four of these have
m2 =1 :
(θ1,θ2,m 2) ∈ {(0,1,1),(1,1,1),(0,0,1),(1,0,1)}
(the remaining four are identical to those above but with m2 =0 ). The event




R, in which case second-period
welfare is (here, as well as in the corresponding expression for the next event,





















The event (0,0,1) happens with probability 1
4pRλ
∗












22The event (1,1,1) happens with probability 1
4pG + 1
4pR, in which case second-
period welfare is (here, as well as in the corresponding expression for the next
event, we make use of (1) and the fact that e pi = pi/(pLλ
∗

















The event (1,0,1) happens with probability 1
















The four cases where m2 =0are analogous to the ones above. Hence, the event
















The event (1,1,0) happens with probability 1
4pLλ
∗












The event (0,0,0) happens with probability 1
4pG + 1











Finally, the event (0,1,0) happens with probability 1























































































































































R (i.e., the fourth, ﬁfth, eighth, and ninth































































1 − (pR − pL)
2
i (14)
(here the ﬁrst equality was obtained by multiplying out the squared terms and
simplifying, and the last equality made use of pG =1−pL−pR). The remaining
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L and pR + pL =1− pG and then simplifying, the above




























From the deﬁnition of λ
∗












Hence, (15) together with (14) give us the expression for EWPI
2 stated in the
lemma. ¤
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